Optimal bailouts, bank’s incentive and risk by Lucchetta, Marcella et al.
Optimal Bailouts, Bank’s Incentive and Risk∗
Marcella Lucchetta, Univ. Venice Michele Moretto, Univ. Padova
Bruno M. Parigi, Univ. Padova and CESifo
May 4, 2019
Abstract
We show how the impact of government’s bailout in the form
of liquidity assistance on a representative bank’s ex ante eﬀort de-
pends on the volatility of its investment. Bank’s investment delivers
a cash flow that follows a geometric Brownian motion and the gov-
ernment guarantees bank’s liabilities. To counter the bank’s expecta-
tions of bailout, the government may choose a tighter liquidity policy
when bank’s eﬀort is not observable than under full information. This
tighter liquidity induces a more prudent ex ante behavior of the bank,
but it may have the opposite eﬀect when the investment volatility
is high. This novel eﬀect arises because the bank could be discour-
aged to be prudent precisely because the chances of receiving liquidity
assistance are low.
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1 Introduction
This paper revisits the relationship between government’s bailouts and bank’s
risk taking, and shows how this relationship depends on the volatility of the
bank’s investment. The massive bailouts during the 2008-2009 financial crisis
have reignited the debate about the danger of excessive bank’s risk taking
when governments rescue distressed banks. The bulk of the literature argues
that the expectations of government’s bailouts weaken market discipline and
leads to excessive bank’s risk taking culminating in banking crises. Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache (2002), Demirgüç-Kunt and Kane (2002) and Barth
et al. (2004) provide evidence in favor of this view. Two papers find evidence
that government’s guarantees increase bank’s risk taking in Germany: Dam
and Koetter (2012) identify the risk taking eﬀect of bailout expectations by
exploiting regional political factors; Gropp et al. (2014) show that the banks
that lost government’s guarantees lowered credit risk by cutting oﬀ riskiest
borrowers. Similarly, Brandao Marques et al. (2013) in an international sam-
ple of rated banks find that government’s support is associated with more
bank’s risk taking, especially prior and during the recent financial crisis. On
the theoretical side Farhi and Tirole (2012) argue that banks may find it opti-
mal to take correlated risks if they believe that bailouts are more likely when
many of them could fail simultaneously. Cordella, Dell’Ariccia and Marquez
(2017) show that when bank capital is endogenous, public guarantees lead
unequivocally to an increase in bank leverage and an associated increase in
risk taking.
To assess the impact of the expectations of bailouts in the form of liq-
uidity injections on bank’s risk taking we embed the action of a bank in a
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dynamic model. We focus on just one bank to abstract from any considera-
tion of contagion and systemic risk and to consider the strategic interaction
between the bank and the policy maker along a single dimension. The bank
has the possibility to make an investment (the "project" hereafter) of given
size, financed with its own capital and government-insured deposits. Be-
fore deciding whether to invest the bank puts unobservable eﬀort to screen
projects to increase the probability that the investment is productive (See
e.g. Holmström and Tirole 1997). The government needs the bank to screen
projects and to provide payment services in the form of deposits. For the
latter objective the government guarantees deposits. If the investment is
productive its output follows a geometric Brownian motion. If the output
exceeds the coupon to pay to the depositors, the shareholders of the bank
keep the diﬀerence and consume it. If the output is insuﬃcient to pay the
coupon, that is if the bank is insolvent, either the government closes it or it
injects liquidity into the bank to pay the diﬀerence and keep it alive. When it
closes it, the government fully reimburses the depositors and sells the bank’s
assets.
The impact of the government’s liquidity policy on bank’s eﬀort depends
on the volatility of the project: a more generous bailout policy lowers bank’s
eﬀort (induces the bank to be less prudent) when the project’s output volatil-
ity is low, and increases eﬀort when volatility is high (Proposition 1). The
reason is that the bank anticipates that high volatility increases the prob-
ability of a bailout, and to take advantage of this, it puts more eﬀort to
increase the chances that the project is productive. The novel eﬀect of a
non-monotonic relationship between liquidity policy and bank’s eﬀort is at
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the heart of our model. It arises because we have cast the bank’s eﬀort choice
in a dynamic model where the government has the option to decide when to
stop injecting liquidity and close an insolvent bank.
The government’s commitment to guarantee deposits can be interpreted
as a call-like option of the bank to obtain liquidity if needed. We measure the
value of this option using a real option framework. The value of the option
feedbacks into the bank’s risk taking. As eﬀort is costly the bank puts more
eﬀort when the value of the option to obtain liquidity is higher. In fact, the
longer the government allows the bank to stay in business (i.e. the looser
is the liquidity policy), the higher the bank profits. When output volatility
is low, the probability of a bailout is low and thus the advantage that the
bank obtains from a bailout is low; hence the incentive to put eﬀort to enjoy
future profits is smaller.
Liquidity policy itself is determined by the government, trading oﬀ two
frictions that work in opposite directions. First, bank closure entails a dead-
weight loss (e.g. fire sale of assets, negative externality). Second, the cost
of liquidity injection increases with the amount of liquidity already injected.
We compute how the government sets the optimal liquidity policy under
full information (FI) (i.e. when the government chooses bank’s eﬀort) and
when bank’s eﬀort is not observable. We show that even under FI and com-
mitment to liquidity policy, it is optimal for the government to delay bank
closure when the output falls short of the coupon; that is, it is optimal to
bailout an insolvent bank for a while (Proposition 2).
Importantly, since both the bank’s eﬀort and the optimal liquidity policy
depend on the level of the project volatility we can conduct some comparative
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static analysis. In particular, under FI as project volatility increases bank’s
eﬀort increases and the optimal liquidity policy becomes tighter (Proposition
3). When bank’s eﬀort is not observable to counter the bank’s expectations
of bailout the government chooses a tighter liquidity policy than under FI
(Proposition 4), a result that holds irrespective of the project volatility if the
government savings from early closure are particularly large.
Our main result (Proposition 5) shows how project volatility aﬀects the
optimal liquidity policy and how this feedbacks into the bank’s eﬀort choice,
and thus on the probability that the project is successful. When project
volatility is low and the government savings from early closure are large,
the optimal liquidity policy is less generous when the bank behavior is not
observable than under FI. This induces the bank to exert a level of eﬀort
higher than socially desirable. However, when project volatility is high the
opposite may happen if the optimal liquidity policy is very tight. This novel
eﬀect arises because the bank could be discouraged to exert a high level of
eﬀort as the chances of receiving liquidity assistance are very low. Therefore,
the relationship between expectations of bailouts and bank’s eﬀort depends
crucially on the volatility of the project, which, in turn, aﬀects the value of
the call-like option of the bank to obtain liquidity.
We stress that Proposition 5 makes the broader point that the impact
of a public safety net policy depends on the exogenous conditions of the
economy. During normal periods (when the variance of the returns is likely
to be low) a restrictive policy has the intended eﬀect of inducing more bank
eﬀort. Vice-versa, during systemic downturns (when the variance of the
returns is likely to be high) the impact can be reversed. This holds true for
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a liquidity support policy as in our model, but also for a deposit insurance
policy. Anginer et al. (2014), for a sample of 4109 banks in 96 countries
over the period 2004-2009, show that deposits insurance has two eﬀects: a
moral hazard eﬀect which prevails in good times, and a stabilization eﬀect
which prevails in crisis times. The latter eﬀect shows up as deposit insurance
increases depositors’ confidence and lowers the probability of bank runs, so
that bank’s risk is lower in countries where the public safety net is more
generous.
1.1 Related literature
Our paper is linked to several strands of literature. First of all our paper is
linked to the studies that challenge the conclusion that expectations of more
generous bailouts induce banks to be less prudent and suggest a complex
relationship between prudential policy, the institutional framework governing
bank resolution and bailouts, and bank’s risk taking.
In particular our paper is closely related to Cordella and Levy-Yeyati
(2003) and Dell’Ariccia and Ratnowski (2014). Cordella and Levy-Yeyati
study a recursive model where bank managers can aﬀect the risk-return pro-
file of their portfolio to exploit the limited liability protection. They show
that besides creating moral hazard, a bailout policy that reimburses the de-
positors contingent on the exogenous (unfavorable) state of nature can have
a positive eﬀect on the bank’s charter value hence providing the bank with
incentive to be more prudent. Dell’Ariccia and Ratnowski in a static model
show that the expectation of government’s support, while creating moral
hazard, also entails a virtuous systemic insurance eﬀect. This eﬀect arises
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because bailouts isolate a bank from the endogenous risk of contagion from
the failure of another bank. Absent bailouts banks take on too much risk
because the contagion externality that their failure generates is not priced
correctly at the margin. A bailout that prevents contagion can correct this
externality and increase the bank’s return from monitoring loans.
Although our paper shares with these two studies the idea that a more
generous liquidity policy may encourage the bank to be more prudent our
results and their sources diﬀer in a number of dimensions. First, Cordella
and Levy-Yeyati consider the simplified problem of the choice of the optimal
risk exploiting the risk-return trade-oﬀ of a portfolio financed with debt.
Therefore their model cannot capture the idea that, unlike in a portfolio of
securities, to lower the risk of a loans portfolio the bank must exert eﬀort
to screen and or monitor loans. Second, in our model unlike Cordella and
Levy-Yeyati the potential beneficial eﬀect of bailouts does not depend on
contingent market conditions, rather it is a function of the standard deviation
of the output, an inherent feature of the project, known at the beginning.
Third, we identify the source of the "charter value eﬀect" in the call-like
option of the bank to obtain liquidity assistance and we measure this value
using a real option framework. Fourth, by casting the problem of liquidity
injection as a real option we can determine the optimal stopping time, that
is the optimal moment for the government to stop injecting liquidity as a
function of the liquidity already injected. Fifth, our framework allows us to
determine how output volatility, which is a crucial determinant of the bank’s
option to obtain liquidity, feedbacks into the government’s liquidity decision
and into the bank’s risk taking. As bank’s eﬀort to prevent risk is costly
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the bank puts more eﬀort when the option value is higher. Finally, unlike
Dell’Ariccia and Ratnowski, in our model we do not need contagion risk to
motivate liquidity support form the government.
In a model where intertemporal consumption risk and asset risk generate
both panic runs and fundamental runs, Allen et al. (2014) study how gov-
ernment’s guarantees aﬀect a bank’s risk choice, measured by the amount of
liquidity held by the bank. They show that broader government’s guarantees
can be preferred if they lower the probability of both panic and fundamental
crises, and that the guarantees do not always induce banks to take excessive
risk.
The view of the policy makers is well represented by Geithner (2014) who
warns against the "fundamentalism of moral hazard", namely the exagger-
ated concern that crisis response policies should always aim at avoiding moral
hazard.
Another strand of literature argues that the government may not be able
to commit to a bailout strategy. Mailath and Mester (1994) investigate
whether the threat to close a bank that has chosen risky assets is ex post
credible. Absence commitment, for certain parameter values, this threat is
not credible, for once the bank has selected risky assets it will not be in the
best interest of the government to close it. Indeed under some parameter
restrictions a bank that has chosen a risky asset in the first period is less
likely to choose a risky asset in the second period. That is, a government may
forebear by not closing an insolvent bank. Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007,
2008) argue that ex ante regulators would like to be tough to prevent excessive
risk taking. However, during systemic crises the costs associated with not
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providing assistance can be so high that regulators may feel compelled to
provide assistance. Bailing out banks at taxpayer’s expenses as opposed to
early liquidation of collateral that may lose value over time, may also be
socially optimal when the probability that the collateral loses value is low
(Kocherlakota and Shim 2007). Shim (2011) shows that a combination of
a risk-based deposit insurance premium and a book-value capital regulation
with stochastic liquidation can implement a regulation akin to the Prompt
Corrective Actions in the USA. Morrison and White (2013) show that a
regulator may prefer not to close a unsound bank because of the fear of
inducing contagion. The action of promptly closing a weak bank reveals that
the regulator has less skill in screening banks than previously expected. This
revelation reduces confidence in other banks screened by the same regulator,
and, in some circumstances, triggers financial contagion and the closure of
these banks, even though their intermediation remains socially valuable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce
the model. In Section 3 we study how the bank’s eﬀort depends on output
volatility and liquidity policy. In Section 4 we study how the government
chooses eﬀort and liquidity policy when it has FI about bank’s eﬀort. In
Section 5 we study the problem that the government faces when it chooses
the liquidity policy without observing bank’s eﬀort and we compare the re-
sulting liquidity policy and bank’s eﬀort with the FI case. The proofs are in
Appendix.
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2 Model set up
This paper studies how the government’s liquidity policy to guarantees a
bank’s liabilities aﬀects the eﬀort that the bank devotes to screen its invest-
ment. At  = 0 the bank, run by a shareholder-manager, has the opportunity
to make an investment (the project) of given size 1. The project is financed
with the exogenous wealth of the bank’s shareholder  and deposits 1 − 
Before deciding to invest the bank exerts unobservable eﬀort  to screen
projects more accurately ex ante. As in Holmström and Tirole (1997) eﬀort
increases the probability  that the project is productive. With complemen-
tary probability the project is not productive and the bank does not invest.
Eﬀort entails a disutility 
2
2,   0 for the bank. This is a standard way
to capture how bank’s eﬀort aﬀects the quality of its investment in a static
setting. See for example De Nicolò and Lucchetta (2009) and Carletti et al.
(2016).
Once the investment is made, following Merton (1974) and Leland (1994)
we assume that it generates a cash flow stream  at each  0 ≤  ∞ Under
the risk-neutral probability measure,  evolves according to a geometric
Brownian motion, i.e.:
 = +  with =0 = 0  0 (1)
where  is the risk-neutral rate of drift,   0 is the exogenous instantaneous
volatility of cash flow and  is a Wiener process.1 The risk-neutral rate of
1The process (1) is quite standard in the banking literature, (see also Black and Cox
1976; Bhattacharya et al. 2002; Decamps et al. 2004; Sundaresan and Wang 2017;
Hugonnier and Morellec 2017). More generally a bank owns a portfolio of risky assets
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drift  is less than the risk-free rate  such that there is a rate-of-return
shortfall , i.e.  =  −  ≥ 02 Furthermore, to simplify the notation, in
what follows we set the risk-neutral drift of (1) equal to zero. That is, on
average, the project’s rate of return equals  plus a risk premium.
The cash flow is the sole state variable and we assume that it is observable
by both the government and the bank. However, there is an important
contracting friction in this economy: namely we assume that cash flow cannot
be stored. This implies that over time the bank cannot build reserves to oﬀset
output short fall. This assumption is not new in the banking literature.
Parlour et al. (2012) assume that dividends must be consumed immediately
and cannot be invested to become new capital. In a model with dynamic
interactions between a banker and a regulator Shin (2011) assumes that the
output is either consumed by the banker or paid to the deposit insurance
fund. This assumption is also linked to the observation of Rajan and Myers
that generate cash flows. The portfolio volatility is measured by  which is also the
volatility of assets cash flow. Since in our model the investment has fixed characteristics,
we do not explore how the governement intervention may aﬀect the portfolio composition
and its volatility. We share this assumption with most of the banking literature. For an
analysis of the asset subsitution eﬀect see, for example, Schneidar and Tornell (2004) and
Pennachi (2006).
2We remind that a world where the expected growth rate is set equal to ( − ) is
referred to as a "risk-neutral" world (see e.g. Cox and Ross, 1976; Harrison and Kreps,
1979; McDonald and Siegel, 1986). The method of risk-neutral valuation suggests that
any contingent claim on an asset, whether traded or not, can be evaluated in a world
with systematic risk by replacing the actual growth rate of the cash flows with a certainty-
equivalent growth rate (by subtracting a risk premium that would be appropriate in market
equilibrium), and then behaving as if the world were risk-neutral (i.e. disconting the
expected cash flows at the riskless rate.)
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(1998) that liquid reserves could be easily wasted or subject to absconding.
For the same reason we assume that the bank keeps no liquidity at  = 0,
that is all the funds raised are invested.3
Depositors are promised a (per unit of deposit) return, a coupon, (1−)
per unit of time. The deposit market is perfectly competitive so that the
bank will set (1 − ) at the level the depositors require to recover their
opportunity cost of funds and to be willing to participate. Since cash flow
cannot be stored, when  − (1 − )  0 for   0 the bank consumes
it immediately. Furthermore, for the rest of the paper, we assume that at
 = 0 the project is viable, i.e. 0 ≥ 1 This means that the bank funds an
infinitely living project that is capable of paying back deposits and capital;
i.e. 0−(1−) −   0 Depositors, the bank, and the government, are risk
neutral.
2.1 Liquidity and probability of bank closure
We assume that the government acts on behalf of society, fully guarantees
both the stock of deposits and their coupons, and provides liquidity to the
bank until it closes it. Thus the government performs the functions of dif-
ferent agencies like the deposit insurance fund and the central bank. We
assume away agency problems between any of these institutions and society,
to focus only on the agency problem between the government and the bank.
When the output falls below the coupon (1 − ) the bank is insolvent
and the only way to pay the coupon is for the government to inject funds,
3In the Appendix we briefly discuss how relaxing this assumption would aﬀect our main
results.
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that we denote "liquidity" for simplicity, to cover the shortfall. Examples of
these government’s interventions include collateralized lending by the central
bank, revolving credit lines, publicly-funded recapitalizations, government’s
guarantees for new debt. As long as it injects funds the government bears
the per period bank losses, − (1−)  0. As we will see later this entails
a distortion.
Since deposits are fully insured, the stochastic process that we consider
enables us to treat the liquidity injections as a buﬀered stochastic flow. More
specifically, the process  has a lower barrier and the government wants
to prevent the stochastic variable from falling below that barrier. In our
model the lower barrier is the coupon  (1− ). Accordingly, the government
intervenes by means of instantaneous, infinitesimal funds injections never
allowing  to go below the threshold (1−) The process  is free to move
as dictated by (1) as long as   (1−) but the instant  crosses (1−)
from above, it is reflected at (1− ).4 Letting ˜ be a version of the process
 reflected at (1 − ) it can be defined as ˜ =  + . The process 
represents the cumulative amount of funds injected up to , has initial value
0 = 0 and increases only when  = (1− )
If the project is productive the bank receives a cash flow net of a coupon
˜− (1− ) until the government closes it. At closing time  , the government
reimburses to the bank the current value of deposits 1−  which in present
value terms is − (1− )  The present expected value of the cash flow net
4A reflected process has the same dynamics as the original process but is required to
stay above a given barrier whenever the original process tends to fall below it. See Harrison
(2013) for a formal definition of these processes.
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of coupon accruing to the bank is:
E[
Z 
0
−(˜ −  (1− ))+ − (1− )] (2)
where E[·] denotes the expectation with respect to (1) conditional on the
information at  = 0.
We denote with  the government’s liquidity policy. Since the government
has discretion to stop injecting liquidity, the closing time associated with the
strategy ˜ =  +  is defined by:
 = inf ( ≥ 0 :  = )  (3)
By (3) the government closes the bank the first time that the process  hits
the threshold  where  ∈ [0∞) the liquidity policy, is the weight that the
government assigns to the cumulated liquidity injected up to date . Now,
assuming that the trigger  is a random variable described by an exponential
distribution independent of (1), we are able to derive the probability of bank
closure as:5
Pr( ≤ ) = Pr (  ) = 1− − (4)
The process  depends on the amount of liquidity already injected 
and the importance (the weight),  that the government assigns to . In
other words, the probability that the government continues to inject liquidity
after time , − declines the more liquidity  it has already injected. If
the government chooses  = 0 it guarantees liquidity forever and the bank
will never be closed, i.e. Pr( ≤ ) = 0. On the contrary, setting  = ∞
means that the government never injects liquidity and closes the bank the
5For the stopping time (3) see Harrison (2013, p. 159-160).
13
first time that  hits the boundary (1−) This captures the notion that the
government updates the probability of closing the bank as a function of both
the liquidity injected and the level of output . Notice that the government
does not commit to a deterministic liquidity policy, rather it commits to how
to respond to the evolution of the output  which makes the closing time 
stochastic.6
When the government closes the bank, it reimburses depositors in full
and cancels the shareholders’s claims, two features that we encounter in most
instances of bank closures. When the bank is closed the government does
not terminate the project, rather it sells the bank’s assets, and receives the
proceeds from the assets sale.
We also assume that the government incurs a deadweight loss   0, from
closing a bank and that this cost, which is not internalized by the bank, is
independent from the time of closure. This cost arises from several sources.
First, a fire sale discount makes the resale value of the assets smaller than
the expected present value of their output stream (Leland 1994). This is so
because, for example, the incumbent bank management is more capable than
anybody else to extract value from these assets (See for example Diamond
and Rajan 2006), or because outsiders can observe the output only at a cost
(Townsend 1979). Second, bank’s closure generates a negative externality as
it may induce financial instability by casting a doubt on the ability of the
bank regulator to screen other banks as in Morrison and White (2013), and
6Dell’Ariccia and Ratnovski (2014) assume that the government can commit to a bailout
strategy. In Shim (2011) stochastic liquidation after output shortfall provides the banker
with incentives to continue to act in the interest of the regulator.
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there may be costs to layoﬀ the bank employees.7
3 Liquidity, eﬀort, and output volatility
Recall that the bank exerts eﬀort  with disutility 
2
2 to increase the proba-
bility that the project is productive. Then, using (2)  the objective function
of the bank can be written as
 = max 
µ
E[
Z 
0
−(˜ −  (1− ))− ¡1− − (1− )¢]¶− 
2
2 (5)
where 1− − (1− ) is the present value of the bank’s net cash outflow for
the investment and consists of the project cost 1, minus the present value
of the deposits that the bank receives if the bank is closed − (1− ) 8 By
7More formally, when the bank is closed, the realized assets will revert to the govern-
ment. The value of these assets is (1− ) where   ( ∈ [0 1)) measures a fire sale cost
(Leland, 1994). As at the closure time  the cash flow is  = (1 − ) and the salvage
value is (1 − ) (1− )  Thus the deadweight  loss is equal to  − (1 − ) (1− )  0
where  is the closure cost, for example from staﬀ layoﬀ.
8Since (5) may appear counterintuitive, observe that if the government never closes the
bank, that is if  →∞ the bank’s objective function becomes
lim→∞ = lim→∞max 
µ
E[
Z 
0
−(˜ −  (1− ))− ¡1− − (1− )]¢¶− 
2
2 =
max 
µ
E
Z ∞
0
−˜+ 1  (1− )− 1
¶
− 
2
2 =
max 
µ
E
Z ∞
0
−˜− 
¶
− 
2
2
That is, the bank spends  to obtain E R∞
0
−˜ which is the present expected value
of the project cash flow.
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using (3), we are able to write (5) as:
 = max 
µ
E
Z ∞
0
−− (˜ −  (1− )) + (1− )E
Z ∞
0
−− − 1
¶
−
2
2
(6)
Formally, in (6) we can regard the project a infinitely-lived one, where the
payoﬀs at each time are multiplied by the probability that the bank is not
closed up to time , −, and
(1− )E
Z ∞
0
−− = (1− )E(−) ≡  (7)
is the discounted expected value of the deposits.9 Thus, the bank chooses
an eﬀort level equal to:10
 = E
Z ∞
0
−−(˜ −  (1− ))+ (1− )E
Z ∞
0
−− − 1
=
0 −  (1− )
 + E
Z ∞
0
−−| {z }

+(1− )E
Z ∞
0
−−)| {z }

−1
(8)
where the term  is the expected present value of total liquidity injections.
Since both  and  are positive, they increase bank’s eﬀort. Substituting
(8) into (6) it is easy to see that
 = 
2
()2 (9)
9Notice that the eﬀect of (3) is similar to calculating the value of an investment oppor-
tunity with an uncertain expiration date. If the expiration date is described by a Poisson
process with parameter  Merton (1973) shows that the investment opportunity is equal
to a perpetual one with the discount rate subsituted by  + 
10When it is not necessary, for the rest of the paper we drop the dependence of  from
the initial condition 0
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so that maximizing  is equivalent to maximize (8).
To compute the discounted expectation in the second and third term
on the R.H.S. of (8) we use the dynamic programming decomposition. We
may split the conditional expectation in (8) into the contribution over the
infinitesimal time interval 0 to  and the integral from  to ∞ with a
particular condition at the (reflecting) barrier (1− ). The solution of (8)
is given by the following Lemma.
Lemma 1: The level of eﬀort (8) is equal to:
 = 0 − (1− ) −
µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )(1 + (1− )) − (1− ) − 1 (10)
where  = 1
2
−
q
(1
2
)2 + 22  0 and   0
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 1 addresses the incentive compatibility problem of the bank, that
is how the bank chooses eﬀort as a function of government intervention (liq-
uidity policy and deposit guarantee). By direct inspection of (8) and (10),
 + is equal to:
 + = −
µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )(1 + (1− )) − (1− )| {z }
0
 0 (11)
which depends on the output volatility  and the government’s liquidity
policy through the stopping rate . In particular, since  which recall is
negative, is monotonically increasing in , the level of output volatility, may
be equivalently characterized in terms of  = () For the rest of the paper
we say that a project is "high volatility" when |  | is very low, i.e. close to
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0 and "low volatility" when |  | is very high. In both cases, however, unless
otherwise specified, we exclude the extreme values  = −∞ where the cash
flow becomes constant over time, and  = 0 where the cash flow volatility
is infinite.11
Making comparative statics analysis on  we try to capture diﬀerent
macroeconomic conditions that could arise from banks operating in diﬀerent
countries, regions, industries, or phases of the business cycle.
By the real option theory (McDonald and Siegel 1984 and Dixit and
Pindyck 1994), equation (11) can be seen as a sum of infinite set of call-like
options. At each time  the bank has the option to use a unit of liquidity
for free to prevent  to fall below (1 − ) Then, the present value of
the total liquidity (11) can be calculated by valuing each of these options
and summing these values up by integrating over time . In particular, as³
0(1−)
´
= E(− )  1 where  is the first time starting from 0 that the
process (1) hits the liquidity threshold (1− ) the term
−(1− )(1 + (1− )) − (1− ) 
in (11) indicates the payoﬀ the bank expects to receive from exercising these
options. The expected present value E(− ) can be determined by using
dynamic programming (see for example Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 315-
316).
11If  = −∞ the model collapses to a static one without uncertainty as in Dell’Ariccia
and Ratnovski (2014) and Carletti et al. (2016).
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We are now able to write (10) as:
 = 0 − 1 + (1− )
⎡
⎢⎢⎣−E(− )
(1 + (1− ))
 − (1− )| {z }
0
− 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦  (12)
Observe that as the value of these options increases with , the last term of
(12) is higher when the project is high volatility. That is, for a high volatility
project, i.e. |  | close to 0 both the payoﬀ of the options and the probability
that they will be exercised, increase. On the contrary the value of these
options tend to−(1−) for low volatility projects, i.e. |  | is very high. Thus
the last term on the R.H.S. of (12) shows the contribution of these options to
increase the bank’s eﬀort above the value of insured deposits (1−). Finally,
as 0 − 1 ≥ 0 the constant  in (10) serves as a normalization.12
Taking the derivative of (10) with respect to , we are able to investi-
gate the eﬀect of the government’s liquidity policy on the bank’s eﬀort. In
particular we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1. The sign of the eﬀect on  of the government’s liquidity
12Note, however, that if the initial valuation of the project is high, it could be always
worth for the bank to exert the maximum level of eﬀort, i.e.  → 1 On the contrary if
the initial valuation of the project 0 is close to the boundary (1− ) we obtain:
lim0→(1−)
 = −(1− )
∙  + 1
 − (1− )
¸

and  is greater than zero only if  + 1  0. That is, if the initial condition on the
cash flow is such that the project starts with low cash flow if the investment is made, the
bank has an incentive to put eﬀort only if the project volatility is "suﬃciently" high to
guarantee that the expected payoﬀ from exercising the call-like options is positive.
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policy, is given by:


 = [−(1− )( + 1)] for  ∈ (−∞ 0)  (13)
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 1 is crucial to understanding why liquidity injections may or
may not induce a bank to increase its screening eﬀort depending on output
volatility. To understand the [−(1 − )( + 1)] recall that   0 and

  0 Thus, if the project is high volatility, i.e. |  | is close to zero such
that +1  0, by (13) we have   0, that is the bank will increase eﬀort
if the government injects more liquidity. Conversely, if the project is low
volatility, i.e. |  | is very high,   0, that is the bank will reduce eﬀort
if the government injects more liquidity.
Intuitively, the reason a looser liquidity policy increases the incentive of
the bank to put eﬀort when the project is high volatility, is that the bank
anticipates that liquidity support is more likely in that case, and that to take
advantage of that it has to put more eﬀort to increase the chances that the
investment is made. This eﬀect arises because we consider a dynamic model
where the longer the government allows the bank to stay in business, the
higher is the expected value of the call-like options to obtain liquidity.
When instead the project is low volatility, the probability of liquidity
support is low and thus the advantage that the bank obtains from a bailout
is low. Indeed, in this case, the looser is the liquidity policy and the lower
the incentive to put eﬀort to enjoy future profits. Both the received view
that argues that expectations of generous bailouts induce banks to be less
prudent, and the studies that challenge this conclusion, capture only a piece
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of the story, because they do not take into account how liquidity policy itself
is set.13 We now turn to determine the optimal liquidity policy as a function
of output volatility. We do so first when the government has full information
on bank’s eﬀort, and then when the government cannot observe bank’s eﬀort.
4 Full information regulation
4.1 The costs of intervention
When the government has full information on the eﬀort of the bank, perhaps
because of on-site inspections, it chooses both the level of eﬀort and the
liquidity policy to maximize its objective function which includes both the
objective function of the bank,  , and the expected costs of the intervention.
Besides the reimbursement of deposits, which has no impact on welfare,
the costs of intervention arise from two frictions with welfare implications:
the deadweight cost of bank closure  discussed above, and the increased
risk of the government’s portfolio from liquidity injections. As for the latter,
we assume that the cost that the government faces to inject liquidity grows
with the amount of liquidity already injected. This reflects the deterioration
of the quality of the portfolio of the authority providing liquidity to the bank
in distress. A bank in distress may lose market access and increase the use
of central bank credit. Since the eligible collateral that central banks accept
13The eﬀectiveness of a more generous liquidity policy in inducing eﬀort if the project
is financed with more equity depends on the output volatility. In particular if output
volatility is high, as  increases, the marginal value of liquidity to induce the bank to
provide eﬀort, declines. The opposite is true when output volatility is low. See Appendix.
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from banks in distress tends to be both of lower quality and more illiquid
(Acharya et al. 2009, Nyborg 2015), as central bank lending becomes more
concentrated on weaker counterparts, the average quality of the risks in the
central bank’s portfolio worsens (Bindseil and Jabłecki 2013). More gener-
ally, Hall and Reis (2015) argue that the unconventional monetary policies
followed by the FED and the ECB after the crisis have exposed them to
increased interest rate and default risks.
Recall that the government guarantees both the deposits and the coupons,
and that the process  is reflected at the lower barrier (1− ) by liquidity
injection. This reflection is costly: in particular, to model the cost of liquidity
injection we assume that the government bears a cost of () units for each
unit of liquidity injected. That is to say, liquidity supply has a time-invariant
marginal cost () per unit of account. Formally this is equivalent to set:
 = ()×  (14)
where  is the increment of liquidity, if any, in the interval (  + )
(We express payments in present value terms, i.e. the liquidity cost has the
dimension of the present value of one unit of account injected in the bank
forever). We assume that the cost of liquidity is a decreasing function of
 with the properties 0()  0 and 00()  0 That is, the cost for the
government declines, although at a declining rate, the sooner it closes a bank
in distress. Furthermore we assume that () ≥ 1 and that there is no
cost over the market rate 1 only if the government closes the bank the first
time that the output falls short of the coupon; i.e. (∞) = 1
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4.2 How the government chooses eﬀort
As in the previous section, indicating with ˜ a version of the process 
reflected at (1− ) the government’s objective function is:
 = max 
∙
E[
Z 
0
−(˜ −  (1− ))− ¡1− − (1− )¢]¸− 
2
2| {z }

−
½

∙
E[
Z 
0
− + −((1− ) + )]
¸¾
= max  − 
∙
E[
Z 
0
− + −((1− ) + )]
¸
 (15)
Using the stopping time (3) and going through the same steps as before,
equation (15) can be reduced to:
 = max 
∙
E
Z ∞
0
−−[(˜ −  (1− ))− ]− E
Z ∞
0
−− − 1
¸
−
2
2
(16)
where E £R∞
0
−−¤ = E(− ) is the discounted expected value
of the cost to close the bank. Thus, the government chooses eﬀort equal to:
 = E
Z ∞
0
−−[(˜ −  (1− ))− ]− E
Z ∞
0
−− − 1
=
0 − (1− )
 + E
Z ∞
0
−−[− (() + )]| {z }

− 1 (17)
The second term on the R.H.S. of (17)  denoted by  is the diﬀerence be-
tween the present value of the liquidity injections,  =  R∞
0
−−
and the additional costs to guarantee liquidity plus the expected discounted
value of the deadweight cost of bank closure,  ≡  R∞
0
−−(() +
). Therefore,  =  −  and can be interpreted as the loss of
project value due to the intervention.
23
Substituting (17) into (16) it is easy to see that:
 = 
2
( )2 (18)
so that also for the government, maximizing  is equivalent to maximize
(17). To compute the discounted expectation in (17) we repeat the arbitrage
calculation of Section 3. The solution of (17) is in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2: Eﬀort under FI is given by:
 = 0 − (1− ) +
0z }| {µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )
≥0z }| {() − 1 + 
 − (1− )| {z }
0
− 1 (19)
Proof: See Appendix.
By direct inspection of (17) and (19),  is negative, which induces the
government to lower eﬀort in (19).14
14Also for the government, similarly to what happens for the bank, when the initial
valuation of the project is high it is worth demanding maximum eﬀort, i.e.  = 1. On
the contrary, if 0 is close to (1− ), we obtain:
lim0→(1−)
 = (1− )[() − 1 + ] − (1− ) − 1  0
That is, if the initial condition on the cash flow is such that if the project is productive,
it will start with low cash flow, it will be never optimal for the government that the bank
puts eﬀort i.e.  = 0. In this case, even if the expected cash flows are suﬃcient to cover
the coupons, the government prefers that the bank puts no eﬀort, that is that it does not
invest.
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4.3 Optimal liquidity policy
We are now able to derive the optimal liquidity policy under FI. Taking the
derivative of (19) with respect to  and collecting the results we obtain:
Proposition 2: Under FI, there exists an optimal liquidity policy 
such that 0   ∞, given by:
0( )( −  (1− )) + (( ) − 1)(1− ) = − (20)
Proof: See Appendix.
Several comments are in order. First, the result that the optimal 
is finite, i.e. it is always optimal to inject some liquidity, means that the
government does not close a bank immediately after an output shortfall,
that is forbearance is optimal under FI. This shows that lack of commitment
is not necessary to establish that the government does not close a bank as
soon as it becomes insolvent.
Second, the L.H.S. of (20) is the net marginal benefit of tightening the
liquidity policy, which is strictly positive, and the R.H.S. is the closure cost.15
In Appendix we see that  is maximized if the loss of value due to govern-
ment’s intervention is minimized. Then an increase of  entails a marginal
reduction of  due to saving the costs of liquidity, 0( )(− (1−))+
(( )−1)(1−) against a marginal increase of to the closure cost−
Third, to better grasp the role of the assumption on () it is useful to
see what the optimal liquidity policy would be if the liquidity supply had
instead a constant marginal cost equal to the market cost, 1 By direct
15Taking the derivative of the L.H.S. of (20)  we obtain: 00( −  (1− ))  0
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inspection of (19) and recalling that   0 one can see that the sign of

 is always negative. Thus, the government would maximize the welfare
function (16) by providing liquidity forever,  = 0 The intuition is evident
from (19). Under FI, the government faces a trade-oﬀ between the cost of
intervention and the level of bank’s eﬀort to increase the probability that the
project is productive. However, if the government’s cost of liquidity is equal
to the market cost, for any given level of volatility, the government is able to
reduce the cost of the intervention by supporting the project forever.
As for the eﬀect of output volatility on bank’s eﬀort and the optimal
liquidity policy we are able to prove that:
Proposition 3: Under FI, both the eﬀort  and the the stopping rate
 decrease as output volatility increases:

  0 and

  0 (21)
Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 3 says that as output volatility increases, the government re-
duces the probability that the project is productive,   0 but it increases
the liquidity injected to keep the bank open once the investment is made,

  0 The intuition for 

  0 is straightforward: a higher level of
output volatility increases the probability that the government has to inject
liquidity into the bank which, ceteris paribus, increases the cost of providing
liquidity and makes  (and thus  ) lower.
The explanation of 

  0 is less intuitive. If we interpret 

 as
the marginal productivity of a restrictive liquidity policy, that is how a unit
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reduction of liquidity is able to aﬀect the probability that the project is
productive, then an increase in output volatility lowers the marginal produc-
tivity of a restrictive liquidity policy (i.e. 2 (() )  0; see Appen-
dix). Therefore, as output volatility increases, if the government wants that
the productivity of liquidity increases, it has to increase the liquidity, i.e.

  0
5 Unobservable eﬀort
5.1 The government problem
In the previous section we have assumed that the government could per-
fectly observe bank’s eﬀort and thus it could dictate its desired level,  
Diﬀerently, in this section we take into account that the government cannot
observe the eﬀort that the bank chooses,  and we explore how this aﬀects
the trade-oﬀ between bank’s eﬀort and the optimal liquidity policy. The
government problem becomes:
  = max 

∙
E[
Z 
0
− [(˜ −  (1− ))− ]− −]− 1
¸
− 
2
()2
(22)
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint of bank’s eﬀort
 = E[
Z 
0
−(˜ −  (1− ))+ −(1− )]− 1 (23)
and the bank’s participation constraint,  ≥ 0
Constraint (23) indicates that the bank chooses eﬀort to maximize its
payoﬀ taking as given the liquidity policy. Substituting (23) in (22) and
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rearranging, we obtain:
  = max 

∙
E[
Z 
0
− [(˜ −  (1− ))−  − −]− 1
¸
− 
2
()2
= max

2
()2 − E[
Z 
0
−  + − (1− ) + −] (24)
By using the stopping time (3) and going through the same steps as in the
previous sections, we can write the last term in (24) as:
E[
Z 
0
− +− (1−)+−] = E[
Z ∞
0
− −[()++(1−)]
(25)
where the R.H.S. of (25)  is the expected costs of government’s intervention
 + which is given by the expected value of additional costs to guarantee
liquidity, plus the expected discounted value of the deadweight cost of bank
closure, and the discounted expected value of the deposits. Observe that by
using (11) and (19) we obtain:
 + = ( +)− ( −  )
= −
µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )(() + (1− ) +  − (1− )| {z }
0
)  0 (26)
Substituting (25) in (24), we are able to write the government’s objective
function as:
  = max

2
()2| {z }

−( +)| {z }
exp ected costs of
government intervention
 (27)
The first term on the R.H.S. of (27) is the bank’s ex-ante value of the project
 , and the second is the expected costs of regulatory intervention, evaluated
at the level of eﬀort  chosen by the bank.
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The government maximizes (27) by trading oﬀ the value of the project
for the bank  and the expected costs of the intervention ( +) Thus
high bank’s eﬀort, on the one hand, increases the value of the project  ,
but on the other one, it increases the expected cost of liquidity, the cost of
closure, and the cost of reimbursing depositors, ( +) The government
determines  in such a way that bank’s eﬀort maximizes  without leading
to excessive expected costs of intervention.
Before maximizing (27), let’s investigate the diﬀerence between  and
 for a given liquidity policy. From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is easy to
show that:
[− ] = −
µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1−)(1− )) + () +  − (1− ) = +  0
(28)
The misalignment with respect to the FI case generates a deadweight loss
for society. In particular, using (28) we are able to rewrite   in (27) as
  = max

2
( )2| {z }

− 
2
[ −  ]2| {z }

 (29)
The first term  in (29) is the government’s objective function under FI,
and the second term  represents the distortion induced by the unobservable
eﬀort, that lowers the government’s objective function.
Next step is to determine the government’s optimal liquidity policy when
eﬀort is unobservable, that we denote . If an optimal  exists, it should
equate the marginal value of liquidity  to its marginal cost

  Although
a close form solution for  is diﬃcult to obtain, we are able to compare 
with   In particular, since by Proposition 2  has an interior maximum,

 |= = 0 it follows that    if   0 From (28) and (29) we
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Figure 1: The government provides (weakly) less liquidity under MH than
under FI;  ≤  .
obtain  = [ −  ](+) so that the sign of  is dictated by the role
played by the government’s liquidity policy in reducing the expected costs
of the intervention  + In this respect we are able to prove the following
Proposition:
Proposition 4: When bank’s eﬀort is not observable, a restrictive liquid-
ity policy reduces (weakly) the expected costs of government’s intervention,
i.e. (+) ≤ 0, when the government’s savings from early closure are par-
ticularly large, i.e.
−0()  (1− ) +  (30)
or, when (30) does not hold, if the volatility of the project’s output is high
(i.e. |  | close to 0). In either case we obtain  ≥  .
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Proof : See Appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that when bank’s risk taking is not observable the
government wants to provide (weakly) less liquidity than under FI
¡ ≥ ¢
to reduce the social distortion, as illustrated in Figure 1. If condition (30)
holds the result is straightforward and irrespective of project’s volatility;
even if condition (30) does not hold, we are able to show that we obtain
 ≥  for high volatility projects (See Appendix). Furthermore, the de-
gree of liquidity restriction that the government implements to address the
unobservablity of bank’s eﬀort plays a crucial role in determining the bank’s
ex ante behavior, as we show in the next subsection.
5.2 Liquidity support lowers bank’s eﬀort?
Finally, we are able to address the question we posed at the beginning of this
paper, namely whether the expectations of government’s liquidity support
induce a bank to put less eﬀort ex ante. To do so we compare the bank’s
eﬀort () under the optimal liquidity policy  when bank’s eﬀort is not
observable, and the bank’s eﬀort  ( ) under the optimal liquidity policy
 when the bank’s eﬀort is observable. Denote by ∆ = ()− ( )
and ∆ = − the variable that measures the severity of the distortion
in the optimal liquidity policy induced by the unobservability of eﬀort. By
taking the Taylor expansion of () around  we obtain:
∆ ' ( )−  ( ) + 
( )
 ∆ (31)
Thus, by (31) the diﬀerence ∆ can be approximated by the sum of two
terms. The first one, ( )− ( )  0 is the diﬀerence −  0 in
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(28) evaluated at the optimal FI policy  from (29)  and measures the cost
of intervention. The last term is related to the bank’s incentive compatibility
constraint as it measures how the government’s liquidity policy aﬀects the
bank’s eﬀort.
If the volatility of the output is low we know from Proposition 1 that
( )
  0 and that ∆  0 if the condition (30) in Proposition 4 holds.
In this case we conclude that ∆  0.
On the contrary, if the volatility is high, from Proposition 1 we have
( )
  0 and from Proposition 4 ∆ ≥ 0. Combining these results,
if the problem posed by the unobservablity of eﬀort is not too severe, i.e.
∆ ' 0 we obtain ∆  0 On the contrary, if that problem is severe, i.e.
∆  0 the reverse can happen.
We resort to numerical examples to better illustrate the role played by
eﬀort unobservability in determining the sign of (31) when volatility is high.
We replace the expressions for ( )  ( ) and ( ) into (31)  For
the diﬀerence ∆ to be positive it must be
  ( ) ≡  − ( − 
 (1− ))[ (1− )) + ( ) +  ]
(1− ) ( + 1) 
(32)
where, from Proposition 1, we assume that  + 1  0 This assumption
reduces the complexity of numerical analysis without aﬀecting the quality of
the results (See Appendix).
To gain some insight about the impact of output volatility on the optimal
liquidity policy, and thus on bank’s eﬀort, we calibrate the model. Let us
assume that  = 2% while  can take on three values: 25% 30% 35% In this
case we obtain (25%) = −0443 40 (30%) = −0333 33 and (35%) =
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Figure 2: As ( ) −  declines, the probability that a tighter liquidity
policy reduces bank eﬀort increases.
−0259 30 Furthermore, let us assume that the deadweight cost of bank
closure is  = 05 equity is  = 01 and, finally, for the cost of liquidity we
adopt the following function () = −2  with  ∈ [0
√] and  = 100
In Figure 2 we plot the function ( ), for diﬀerent values of  From
(32) we know that ∆  0 if ∆  ( )− where, recall, ∆ measures
the severity of the problem caused by the unobservability of eﬀort. We note
that as  increases the diﬀerence ( ) −  declines, which, for a given
value of ∆ increases the probability that ∆  ( ) −  is violated.
That is, as the diﬀerence ( )−  declines, the probability of having a
liquidity policy  that aﬀects negatively the bank’s eﬀort,∆  0, increases.
We summarize the above observations in the following proposition.
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Proposition 5: When the bank’s eﬀort is not observable, the govern-
ment’s optimal liquidity policy has a diﬀerent impact on bank’s eﬀort depend-
ing on the level of output volatility. By collecting the results of the previous
sections, we can state that:
a) when the output volatility is low, and condition (30) holds, ∆  0;
b) when the output volatility is high, but the optimal liquidity policy is not
too restrictive, ∆  0;
c) on the contrary, when the output volatility is high and the optimal
liquidity policy is very restrictive, it could be that ∆  0
Several observations are in order. First, Proposition 5 establishes that
the relationship between government’s liquidity support and bank’s eﬀort
depends crucially on the volatility of the output. When the latter is low and
condition (30) holds (point a)), it is optimal for the government to provide
a less generous liquidity policy when the bank’s behavior is not observable
than under FI,    . Anticipating this, the bank behaves even more
prudently than socially desirable, 1− ()  1−  ( ).
A similar distortion arises when volatility is high (point b)) and it is
optimal for the government to establish a liquidity policy which is not too
restrictive, albeit more stringent than under FI,    . The combination
of high output volatility and a restrictive liquidity policy, still induces the
bank to behave even more prudently than socially desirable. Points a) and
b) both illustrate the eﬀect stressed in the literature that argues that less
generous bailouts induce banks to behave more prudently.
A qualitatively new eﬀect arises instead when output volatility is high
and the severity of the distortion caused by the unobservability of eﬀort calls
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for a very restrictive liquidity policy (point c)). When the optimal liquidity
policy under unobservable eﬀort is much tighter than under FI ¡  ¢,
the bank could find it optimal to be less prudent than socially desirable,
1 − ()  1 −  ( ) This novel eﬀect stems from the fact that the
bank anticipates that an output shortfall is likely given the high level of
the output volatility. However, the bank knows that it cannot count on
generous liquidity support, which could discourage it from being prudent
ex ante. This illustrates the notion that when output volatility is high,
addressing a severe distortion caused by unobservable eﬀort with a very tight
liquidity policy, although optimal from a welfare standpoint, may back fire
in terms of stability. This eﬀect is similar to the one stressed by the studies
that challenge the received view that generous bailouts induce bank’s risk
taking, in particular Cordella and Levy-Yeayati (2003) and Dell’Ariccia and
Ratnovski (2014).
Second, output volatility can diﬀer for many reasons, among which, as
argued, because banks may operate in diﬀerent countries or be in diﬀerent
phases of the business cycle. As for the latter the novel eﬀect arises when
volatility is high, which is more likely the case in crises times; when markets
are calm the eﬀect stressed by the literature arises. In the case of countries,
output volatility is more likely to be high in emerging economies subject to
shocks potentially outside their controls. Proposition 5 shows that for those
economies a tight liquidity policy could be further destabilizing.
Third, although endogenizing output volatility is not the aim of this pa-
per, we can conjecture that when output volatility is high and the optimal
liquidity policy is very tight, if the bank could it would lower output volatil-
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ity because it knows that the chances of being illiquid are high. Therefore
the bank would like to lower the risk of being illiquid precisely when liq-
uidity support is unlikely. This, in turn, should lower the reduction of the
equilibrium eﬀort. More generally in a model where the output volatility is
endogenous, eﬀort and volatility could work as substitutes.
To sum up, Proposition 5 shows that while a less generous liquidity sup-
port induces for sure the bank to be more prudent when output volatility
is low as the received view argues, this relationship is ambiguous when out-
put volatility is high. In fact a tighter liquidity policy could be destabilizing
and could induce the bank to be less prudent, precisely when the underlying
volatility of its investment is already high, and the distortion induced by
unobservable eﬀort severe.
6 Conclusions
We are able to capture the complex interactions between cash flow volatility,
expectations of government’s support, in the form of liquidity injections,
and bank’s behavior, because we have cast the bank’s and the government’s
choices in a dynamic model. In our model bank’s output follows a continuous
time process and the government’s decision to end liquidity injections entails
the exercise of a real option whose value crucially depends on the volatility
of the process governing the output from the investment.
At the center of our analysis is the notion that the exogenous volatility
of the bank’ investment aﬀects the severity of the problem induced by unob-
servable eﬀort and the optimal liquidity policy to address it, which, in turn,
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aﬀects the bank’s ex ante behavior.
By making liquidity policy endogenous as a function on external condi-
tions, our paper reconciles the studies that show that expectations of gov-
ernment’s supports increase bank’s risk taking, and the recent studies that
challenge this view. When cash flow volatility is taken into consideration
and liquidity supports are optimally set, the relationship between liquidity
support and bank’s incentives to behave prudently is not monotonic. In par-
ticular when volatility is low, and the optimal liquidity policy is tight, less
generous liquidity supports induce banks to put more eﬀort ex ante to screen
the projects more carefully. Similarly, when volatility is high and the opti-
mal liquidity policy is tight, less generous liquidity supports induce banks to
be more prudent. However, when high volatility induces a severe distortion
due to unobservable eﬀort, the very tight liquidity requested to address the
unobservable eﬀort could make the bank less willing to exert eﬀort.
7 Appendix
7.1 Liquidity buﬀers
We canmodel liquidity buﬀers introducing a second process  that represents
the bank’s payouts strategy. Defining ˜ a version of the process  with the
liquid reserves, this is given by:
˜ =  +  −  (33)
where  is an adapted, left-continuous and non-decreasing process with ini-
tial value 0 = 0 which represents the bank’s cumulative payouts to its
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shareholders. Now the two cumulative processes become:
 = max
0≤≤ [−  − ]
−  (34)
and
 = max
0≤≤ [ −  − (1− )]
− (35)
where  is the upper level of  above which the bank distributes dividends.
That is, the payout policy consists in distributing dividends to maintain
liquid reserves at or below the target level . With the process (33), the
government intervenes only when  −  ≥ 0 i.e. when the liquidity buﬀer
generated by  is not suﬃcient to keep ˜ above (1 − ) Under these
assumptions the objective function of the bank is:
 = max 
∙
max
µ
E[
Z 
0
−(˜ − )− ¡1− − (1− )¢]¶¸− 
2
2 (36)
subject to (34) and (35).
In (36), the bank chooses both  and  while the government chooses
 . If reserves do not pay interests (e.g. as in Hugonnier and Morellec 2017)
it is easy to conjecture that the bank chooses  = (1 − ). Indeed the
government’s liquidity support is akin to raise equity in the market; there is
no reason to hold liquidity buﬀers if the bank can count on liquidity support
for a while. In general, however, with a   (1− ) the value of the project
(36) is lowered, although qualitatively, nothing changes regarding the choice
of .
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7.2 Proof of Lemma 1.
Defining:
(0) ≡ E
Z ∞
0
−−(˜ −  (1− ))+ (1− )E
Z ∞
0
−−
the Bellman equation is:
 = 0 −  (1− ) + →0 1E[
] (37)
Using the stochastic process (1) and Ito’s Lemma on E[(0)], we obtain
the following partial diﬀerential equation:
1
2
2200 −  = −(0 − (1− )) for 0 ∈ [(1− )∞) (38)
with boundary conditions:
lim0→∞
[ − 0 −  (1− ) ] = 0 (39)
0((1− ))− [((1− ))− (1− )] = 0 (40)
where 0 and 00 represent the first and the second derivative of  (0)
w.r.t.  Equation (39) states that, when cash flows go to infinity the eﬀort
must be bounded. In fact, the second term in (39) represents the discounted
present value of excess returns over an infinite horizon starting from 0. The
boundary condition (40) means that when the cash flows reach the lower
boundary (1 − ), to continue to keep the bank open the marginal value
of one extra unit of liquidity must not fall below the bank’s cost to increase
eﬀort by one unit represented by [((1−))−(1−)].16 By the linearity
16The boundary condition (40) requires a linear combination of the unknown function
() and its first derivative 0() at  = (1 − ) In diﬀerential equation therory this
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of the diﬀerential equation (38) and making use of (39), the general solution
of (38) takes the form:
 = 0 − (1− ) +(0)
 (41)
where  is a constant to be determined and  with −∞    0 is the
negative root of the characteristic equation 1
2
2(−1)− = 0The boundary
condition (40), yields the value of the constant :
[
1
 + ((1− )
−1]− [(1− )] + (1− ) = 0
 = −(1− )(1 + (1− )) − (1− )| {z }
0
[ (1− )]−  0 (42)
Then, the expected present value of the total liquidity supplied is equal to:
0 = −
µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )(1 + (1− ))
 − (1− )  0 (43)
Finally, substituting (43) in (41), we are able to write the eﬀort as in the
text.
7.3 Proof or Proposition 1.
Taking the derivative of the eﬀort level (10) with respect to  we obtain:

 = −
µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )(1− )( − (1− )) + (1 + (1− ))(1− )
( − (1− ))2
(44)
= −Γ()(1− ) ( + 1) 
condition is called Robin (or third type), boundary condition. See Harrison (2013) p.
159-160 for an application of this condition in a context similar to ours.
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where
Γ() ≡
µ 0
(1− )
¶
1− 
( − (1− ))2  0 (45)
By (44) it is easy to show that:

  0 if   −1;

  0 if   −1
Moreover, taking the limits:
lim→0

 = −
1
()2   0; lim→−∞

 = 0
7.4 Equity and liquidity policy
In the model we have assumed that the project is financed with the exogenous
equity of the bank’s shareholder  and deposits 1 −  In what follows we
explore the eﬀectiveness of the liquidity policy in inducing eﬀort if the project
is financed with more equity. Recall that the impact of liquidity on eﬀort is
given by

 = −Γ()(1− ) ( + 1) 
where recall Γ() is defined in (45)  Taking the derivative of Γ() with
respect to  we obtain:
Γ()
 = Γ()
∙  − 1
(1− ) +
2
( − (1− ))
¸
 0
Therefore


µ

¶
=  ( + 1)Γ()|{z}
0
∙
− + 2− 2(1− )
( − (1− ))
¸
| {z }
0
(46)
whose sign depends on the sign of  + 1 If the project’s volatility is high,
i.e. |  | is close to zero such that  + 1  0, then the sign of (46) is
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positive. Intuitively, in Proposition 1 we have established that if volatility
is high the decision of the government to provide a more generous liquidity
support (that is to lower ) induces the bank to increase eﬀort (  0)
Then if  increases, the marginal value of liquidity to induce the bank to
provide eﬀort declines, i.e. 
³


´
 0
On the contrary if the project volatility is low, when the government
increases liquidity it induces the bank to lower eﬀort (  0) In this case,
since if  → −∞ we have  + 1  0, then the larger is the equity, the lower
will be the reduction of eﬀort, 
³

´
 0. That is, again the marginal
value of liquidity on the bank’s eﬀort declines. To sum up the eﬀectiveness
of a more generous liquidity policy in inducing eﬀort declines with eﬀort.
7.5 Proof of Lemma 2.
Defining
 (0) ≡ E
Z ∞
0
−−[(˜−  (1− ))−]−E
Z ∞
0
−−
the solution for  is obtained by solving the following Bellman equation:
1
2
22 00 −  = −(0 − (1− )) for 0 ∈ [(1− )∞) (47)
with boundary conditions:
lim0→∞
[ − 0 − (1− ) ] = 0 (48)
 0((1− ))− [ ((1− )) + ] =  ()  (49)
While (48) is equal to (39), and has the same meaning, condition (49) re-
places the boundary condition (40). In fact, since liquidity is costly for the
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government, at each liquidity injection the marginal value of continuing to
keep the bank open must not fall below the marginal cost, that now includes
both the cost of liquidity  () as well as the deadweight cost of bank closure
, i.e.:
 () + [ ((1− )) + ]
Again, by the linearity of the diﬀerential equation (47) and making use of
(48), the general solution takes the form:
 = 0 − (1− ) +

0  (50)
where  is a constant to be determined and   0 is still the negative root
of the characteristic equation 1
2
2( − 1)−  = 0 Using (49) we obtain:
 = (1− )[(() − 1) + ] − (1− )| {z }
0
((1− ))−  0
from which:
0 =
µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )[(() − 1) + ]
 − (1− )  0 (51)
which is , the loss of project value due to government’s intervention. Since
(51) is negative it concurs to lower the level of eﬀort. Finally, substituting
(51) in (50) we are able to obtain the expression in the text.
7.6 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3.
To prove Proposition 2, recall that from (18) maximizing  is equivalent to
maximize   and that from (19) the probability of success is
 = 0 − (1− ) +( )− 1
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where, recall,
( ) =
µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )(() − 1) +  − (1− )  0 (52)
To maximize  we look for a  that minimizes  Let us consider the
F.O.C.:

 =
µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )(
0() + )( − (1− )) + [() − 1 + ](1− )
( − (1− ))2
(53)
= Γ() [0() +  − (1− )0() + (() − 1)(1− )] = 0
where recall Γ() is defined in (45)  Hence we obtain:

 = Γ()[
0()( − (1− )) + (() − 1)(1− ) + ] = 0 (54)
In addition the S.O.S.C. is always satisfied, i.e.:
2
2 =
Γ()
 []|{z}
=0 by F.O.C.
+ Γ() [00() − (1− )0() − (1− )00()]
(55)
= Γ() [00()( − (1− ))− (1− )0()]| {z }

 0
This proves Proposition 2.
To prove Proposition 3 we first analyze the eﬀect of  on the level of eﬀort
  In particular, taking the derivative of (10)  i.e. (52)  with respect to 
we obtain:

 =



 +



 
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Taking the derivative of  with respect to  and observing that  = 0
by (54)  we obtain:



 =µ 0
(1− )
¶
(1− )() − 1 +  − (1− )
∙
log
0
(1− ) −
1
 − (1− )
¸ 
  0
from which it follows that 

  0 Now, totally diﬀerentiating (54) with
respect to  and using (55) we obtain:

 = −
()

()

= −[
0() + ]
 = −
0z }| {
[
−(() − 1)(1− )− (1− )
 − (1− ) ]
0z}|{

  0  0
(56)
To gain the intuition for why 

  0 observe that the regulator maximizes
 w.r.t.  by maximizing   So, at the maximum we have:

 (() ) = 0 (57)
Taking the total diﬀerential of (57) w.r.t. , we obtain:
2
2 (() )

 +
2
 (() ) = 0
from which

 = −
2
 (() )
2
2 (() )
 0 (58)
Now, since 22 (() )  0 from (58) we have 

  0 if 
2
 (() ) 
0 If we interpret  as the marginal productivity of a restrictive liquidity
policy, then 
2
 (() )  0 denotes that an increase in output volatility
lowers the marginal productivity of a restrictive liquidity policy. Therefore,
as output volatility increases, if the government wants that the productivity
of liquidity increases, it has to increase the liquidity, i.e. 

  0
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7.7 Proof of Proposition 4.
We prove  ≥  for high volatility projects first, and then we add a
suﬃcient condition for  ≥  for low volatility projects. We proceed in
steps.
First step. Recall that   = −  The F.O.C. is:
 
 =

 −

 = 0 (59)
As is concave with  |= = 0 if a value  that satisfies (59) exists, for
   it must be that   0. In particular, since [− ] = +  0
we have  = [ −  ](+)  Then, comparing  with   we obtain
 ≥  if (+) ≤ 0
Second step. The sign of (+) = [
− ]
 is given by:
( +)
 = (60)
−Γ() {[1−  + 0() + ]( − (1− )) + [(1− )) + () + ](1− )} 
where Γ()  0 is defined in (45). Expression (60) is continuous in  (i.e.
) In addition, (+) from (60) is ≤ 0 if:
−[0() + ((1− ) + )] ≤ [()− 0()](1− )) (61)
Since the R.H.S. of (61) is always positive, there exists a value of  in the
region [0∞) that satisfies (61). In the specific, if the project is high volatility
(i.e. |  | is close to 0) (61) is easily satisfied for any acceptable range of .
Third step. Since  −   0, combining with (+) ≤ 0 for high
volatility projects we obtain  ≥  
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Fourth step. For a low volatility project (i.e. when |  | is high) the sign
of (+) is harder to determine. However, from (61) a suﬃcient condition
for (+) ≤ 0 regardless of the project’s volatility is (30)  that is
0() + (1− ) +   0⇔−0()  (1− ) +  (62)
Thus, if (62) holds then    for all value of  This proves Proposition
4.
7.8 Analysis of equation (32).
Replacing the expressions for ( )  ( ) and ( ) into (31)  we
obtain:
∆ = −Γ() £ (1− )) + ( ) +  ¤ (63)
−Γ()(1− )( − 
 (1− )) + (1 +  (1− ))(1− )
( −  (1− )) ∆
Rearranging (63) it is easy to see that for the diﬀerence ∆ to be positive it
must be:
∆ =  −   −( − 
 (1− ))[ (1− )) + ( ) +  ]
(1− ) ( + 1) 
where we assume, like in Proposition 1, that if the project is high volatility,
i.e. |  | is close to zero, then  + 1  0
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